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	 Discussions of how best to alleviate poverty often center on the relative merits 
of policies that boost growth and those that promote redistribution. If greater inequal-
ity allows economies to expand faster, or if it’s an inevitable consequence of progrowth 
measures, the two principles seem incompatible. Under such a scenario, societies seeking 
rapid growth rates have to forgo redistribution from rich to poor. Conversely, choosing a 
high degree of redistribution implies the decision to accept lower growth rates. 
  If, on the other hand, inequality impedes growth, these principles aren’t only 
compatible but may, in fact, reinforce one another. François Bourguignon, the former 
World Bank chief economist, wrote: “If one interprets literally the potentially negative 
relationship between inequality and growth, then redistribution [from rich to poor] 
would enhance growth. It would then be sufficient to have at one’s disposal policy instru-
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ments to guarantee that growth is 
pro-poor—i.e. that it reduces inequal-
ity—for a virtuous circle to start and 
lead progressively to faster growth, 
declining inequality, and accelerated 
poverty reduction.”1
  The question of whether inequal-
ity impedes or fosters economic 
growth once seemed largely settled, 
with traditional economic theory 
focusing on inequality’s beneficial 
effects on saving, investment and 
incentives. In the past two decades, 
however, research has identified new 
channels between inequality and 
growth, suggesting a more subtle rela-
tionship than the one advanced by 
earlier theorists. 
  The new work doesn’t refute 
many of the important insights of clas-
sical economics, but it points out that 
inequality can have disruptive effects 
on resource allocation in economies 
where markets function poorly. In-
equality, therefore, is more likely to 
be harmful in countries with weak 
institutions for the exchange of goods, 
services and money. This confirms 
the idea that improved market institu-
tions are a key condition for economic 
success.
  Trade-offs between inequality and 
growth aren’t merely theoretical mat-
ters. They’re crucially important not 
only for policymakers who shape their 
countries’ safety nets but also for mon-
etary authorities seeking to understand 
potential growth rates and make more 
informed policy decisions.
Classical Views 
  Until recently, a broad set of ideas 
led much of the economic profession 
to opine that inequality was, if any-
thing, favorable to—or at least a neces-
sary by-product of—economic growth.2 
  In classical models, economic 
growth depends chiefly on the rate at 
which nations accumulate productive 
resources, a factor that traces to aggre-
gate savings rates. In this context, 
distributional considerations matter 
for growth only if households’ pro-
pensity to save varies systematically 
  The classical view long domi-
nated economic thought and empha-
sized that policies designed to reduce 
inequality would entail adverse conse-
quences for economic growth.
Recent Challenges 
  Over the past two decades, these 
conventional notions have been chal-
lenged both on empirical and theoreti-
cal grounds. In cross-country compari-
sons, for example, researchers have 
generally found a negative relation-
ship between income inequality and 
subsequent economic growth. These 
empirical findings, taken at face value, 
suggest that more equality could, in 
fact, foster growth.3 
  We illustrate the empirical argu-
ment by plotting income inequality in 
1960 against average growth rates over 
the next four decades for all countries 
with available data. The results sug-
gest, albeit weakly, that nations with 
more initial income inequality have 
tended to fare worse in the long run 
than countries with greater equality 
(Chart 1). In this example, inequality 
alone accounts for a fairly small frac-
with wealth. If the rich save at a high 
rate, a view closely associated with  
prominent economist Nicholas Kaldor, 
unequal societies can actually build up 
their productive infrastructure faster 
than equal ones, achieving higher 
growth rates. 
  Inequality could also foster 
growth because new industries typi-
cally require large initial investments. 
If credit markets function poorly, a 
society’s savings may not be efficiently 
transferred to investments. In this 
environment, a high concentration 
of wealth may allow some investors 
to overcome these impediments and  
stimulate growth by bringing capital-
intensive industries into being.
  In the early work, income or 
wealth redistribution policies are 
overwhelmingly viewed as detri-
mental to growth based on at least 
two arguments. First, redistribution 
via such instruments as progressive 
taxation distorts incentives to save, 
which reduces resource accumulation. 
Second, some variation in economic 
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tion of the variance in growth across 
countries.
  Even so, a growing body of 
empirical work finds that inequality 
remains significantly correlated with 
future growth even after controlling 
for other important factors, such as 
nations’ initial level of development. 
Furthermore, the correlation between 
inequality and growth seems particu-
larly strong among certain subgroups 
of nations—for example, those in 
which private credit is scarce. 
  Several caveats are in order. First, 
the empirical exercises don’t imply 
that causation runs from inequality 
to growth. Second, most studies rely 
on measures of inequality of income 
rather than wealth. Because the theo-
retical work focuses on the distribu-
tion of productive resources, wealth 
inequality would be preferable, but 
little data exist on it. Finally, changing 
estimation techniques and time peri-
ods yields different results.4 
  Although cross-country studies 
have produced mixed results, they 
do suggest that inequality may not 
be conducive to growth. The statisti-
cal associations, however, reveal 
little about why. A historical example 
can shed some light on the mecha-
nism through which inequality might 
impede economic growth.
  If we look at the Western 
Hemisphere, we see that the United 
States and Canada have emerged as its 
strongest economies (Chart 2), with 
per capita GDP five to six times the 
South American average.5
  It was not always this way. In the 
century before the U.S. was founded, 
Caribbean islands such as Barbados 
and Cuba produced 50 to 70 percent 
more output per person than did 
colonial America. Large swaths of 
South America, including Brazil, were 
also ahead of the U.S. and Canada. 
Contemporary observers routinely pre-
dicted that fortune could be found in 
these nations, rather than the U.S. or 
Canada, a belief borne out by migra-
tion patterns that show most Atlantic 
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South America. 
  What gave the United States and 
Canada their eventual edge over other 
apparently better-positioned nations? 
To answer this question, it’s impor-
tant to look at past structural differ-
ences between Western Hemisphere 
economies. 
  Caribbean and certain South 
American nations relied primarily on 
such high-value agricultural crops as 
sugar, which entail substantial econo-
mies of scale in production. These 
societies developed with large num-
bers of laborers working for relatively 
few landowners. The results were a 
vastly unequal distribution of income 
and little prospect that citizens could 
escape their station through upward 
mobility.
  Much of Canada and the U.S., 
on the other hand, offered land in 
abundance but lacked the physical 
conditions conducive to large-scale 
farming in the colonial era. This led 
to societies in which newcomers with 
few assets could compete on relatively 
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interests of the broad populace, not a 
small elite.6
  The provision of public education 
in the Americas provides at least some 
evidence of a correlation between 
inequality and suffrage. If highly 
skewed income distributions produce 
highly skewed institutions that rein-
force the status quo, we would expect 
relatively equal societies to provide 
universal schooling to their children, 
and relatively unequal societies to be 
less likely to do so. 
  This is indeed what we’ve seen in 
the Western Hemisphere over the past 
two centuries. The U.S. and Canada 
achieved literacy rates in excess of 
80 percent by the 1870s, even if we 
include newly freed U.S. slaves (Chart 
3). Institutions—usually state and 
local governments—understood and 
embraced the notion that education 
would help bring prosperity to the 
citizenry.
  Other nations in the hemisphere 
with more unequal distributions of 
income and power were far below the 
U.S. and Canada in literacy in 1870. 
With the exception of tiny Barbados, 
no other Western Hemisphere nation 
had achieved 80 percent literacy rates 
half a century later. At least some have 
argued that this dearth of educational 
opportunity is due to suboptimal insti-
tutions’ focus on protecting the few 
rather than enriching the many.7
New Theories
  These empirical arguments have 
prompted the development of new 
theories that provide explanations for 
why inequality might hinder economic 
growth. A lot of this work focuses on 
situations in which market mecha-
nisms falter, whereas the classical 
theorists often assumed properly func-
tioning markets.
  The new work points out, for 
instance, that dispersion in factor 
endowments implies different rates 
of return when resource owners are 
unable to trade with one another—at 
least under the standard assumption 
that returns to factors are diminishing. 
In other words, high-return uses of 
resources coexist with much lower-
return ones. Redirecting resources 
toward the more productive enterpris-
es should bolster growth and make 
income more equal.8 However, market 
residents. The results were a relatively 
equal distribution of income and a 
relatively large amount of movement 
between income classes. 
  These fundamental economic 
realities led the rest of the hemisphere 
to develop institutions that were very 
different from the U.S. and Canada. 
When income and power are in the 
hands of a few, institutions tend 
to reinforce that concentration and 
perpetuate a high degree of income 
inequality. It was difficult for poor 
workers in many Caribbean and South 
American nations to acquire land, start 
corporations, secure patents or do any 
of the other things that generally go 
along with entrepreneurial success. 
  A more equal distribution of 
income and power makes it more dif-
ficult to create institutions that concen-
trate influence in the hands of a few. 
In the U.S and Canada, economically 
disadvantaged groups had a greater 
say in policy and more incentive 
to use their influence because they 
could hope to become prosperous 
themselves.
  Comparing suffrage across coun-
tries provides some support for these 
notions. It’s well known that the U.S. 
initially restricted voting to white 
males of privilege, which led to par-
ticipation rates that would be regarded 
as pitiful by today’s standards. In the 
1850s, for example, 13 percent of 
American citizens voted in presidential 
elections, and participation rose to a 
still-low 18 percent in 1900. Yet, vot-
ing rates at the dawn of the 20th cen-
tury were far lower in other Western 
Hemisphere nations—1.8 percent in 
Argentina, 2.4 percent in Brazil, 4.4 
percent in Chile. 
  While the U.S. and Canada 
moved far more slowly toward uni-
versal suffrage than many would have 
liked, their polities were far more par-
ticipatory than those of their Western 
Hemisphere counterparts. And empiri-
cal evidence supports the notion that 
expanded suffrage tends to produce 
governments whose programs are 
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impediments short-circuit this process, 
leading to more inequality and slower 
growth.
  Another strand of recent work 
starts with the assumption that bor-
rowers exert more effort when their 
stakes in projects are higher. Under 
that premise, it’s possible to envision 
an environment where a more even 
distribution of resources gives more 
participants a significant interest, lead-
ing to a higher average level of effort 
and greater output.9 We get similar 
results under the simple assump-
tion that insufficient collateral leads 
some borrowers to forgo high-return 
projects.10
  Another branch of inquiry focuses 
on political-economy questions and 
finds that greater inequality increases 
public support for redistribution, 
which leads to higher tax rates on 
capital accumulation and slower 
growth of the overall economy.11 
  These models show links 
between equality and growth, but they 
don’t generally account for movements 
up and down the income distribution 
ladder. In some countries, it’s difficult 
for people to leave the economic stra-
ta into which they were born. Other 
nations exhibit a great deal of upward 
mobility, often because of better edu-
cation systems and well-functioning 
markets.
  A fair amount of empirical work 
suggests that market-oriented econo-
mies such as the U.S. facilitate income 
mobility.12 When citizens believe great-
er wealth may be in their future, they 
may vote as if they were “richer” than 
they actually are—a phenomenon that 
suggests a relatively equal distribution 
of opportunity may be a more impor-
tant determinant of growth than a rela-
tively equal distribution of income.13
  These theoretical constructs 
provide a possible explanation for 
the observed negative relationship 
between inequality and growth and, 
in some cases, a potential rationale for 
redistribution. But it should be noted 
that these theories emphasize imper-
fections—be they barriers to trade or 
financial market access—that may be 
difficult to overcome through standard 
income-redistribution programs. 
  Moreover, the classical notion 
that redistribution distorts incentives 
to save and work can’t be dismissed, 
creating trade-offs between redistribu-
tion’s potential economic gains and its 
adverse consequences. Models typi-
cally find a hill-shaped relationship, 
where redistribution adds to growth 
for a while but eventually reaches a 
point where it becomes a drag on the 
economy.14
Institutional Links
  One of the distinguishing features 
of developing nations is the inefficiency 
of their basic economic institutions, 
such as property rights enforcement 
and the ability of ordinary people to 
undertake market transactions. Among 
many negative consequences, these 
imperfections limit access to financial 
markets throughout the developing 
world. Less credit stifles growth, leading 
to lower per capita incomes (Chart 4).
  Understanding the links between 
inequality and institutional develop-
ment requires that we explain how 
better institutions help markets operate 
more effectively and devise a method 
for distributing the burden of institu-
tion building across taxpayers.15 Setting 
aside political constraints, this frame-
work predicts that economies with 
more inequality should be more will-
ing to develop institutions conducive 
to trade among their citizens because 
greater inequality means potentially 
higher returns from exchange between 
the relatively rich and relatively poor.
  This prediction seems puzzling 
in light of the historical evidence for 
the Western Hemisphere. In that case, 
nations with the most unequal distri-
butions of wealth and income devel-
oped the least market-friendly institu-
tions, while nations with more equal 
distributions developed the strongest 
institutions. 
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Fraser Institute’s rankings for regula-
tion of credit, labor and business.17 
These scores include factors such as 
price controls, mandatory hiring costs 
and the availability of capital to the 
private sector. 
  Among the third of countries with 
the weakest market institutions, we 
see a negative relationship between 
inequality and growth, echoing our 
earlier results (Chart 5A). When we 
isolate the third of countries with the 
strongest institutions, however, inequal-
ity has a barely discernible impact on 
economic growth (Chart 5B). 
  We don’t have data on whether 
countries did have effective market 
institutions in the past, which helps 
explain why our findings in these 
charts are fairly weak. Despite the 
data constraints, differences are pres-
ent, suggesting that the quality of mar-
ket-related institutions matters to the 
relationship between inequality and 
growth.
Obstacles to Development
  While recent work has enhanced 
our understanding of the interplay 
between inequality and growth, much 
remains to be done before we can 
confidently describe the policy mix 
that will give nations the best chance 
to grow and reduce poverty.
  To date, little effort has been 
made to carefully quantify the impor-
tance of the channels emphasized by 
the new theories on inequality. Once 
devised, these models should enable 
us to better weigh the consequences 
of redistribution.
  On a more basic level, a wide gap 
remains between the variables these 
theories highlight and the available 
data. Most obviously, data on wealth 
inequality remain scarce, even for 
industrialized nations, let alone devel-
oping nations. We also need a deeper 
understanding of the link between 
available measures of inequality and 
the dispersion of returns to competing 
uses of resources.
  Finally, we have chosen to con-
centrate on the impact of inequality 
reasonable once we take a broader 
perspective. The link from the distri-
bution of investment returns to growth 
and institution building depends in 
sometimes counterintuitive ways on 
the distribution of resources across 
individuals.
  In Latin America, for instance, the 
concentration of productive resources 
has historically been high not only 
with respect to physical capital and 
land but also education and other 
forms of human capital. To the extent 
that physical and human resources are 
complementary in production, inequal-
ity may in fact be associated with very 
little dispersion in marginal products. 
Institutions conducive to trading 
physical resources may not have much 
effect on growth rates unless resource-
poor individuals acquire more human 
capital. Redistribution schemes that 
target physical resources may be inef-
fective for similar reasons.
  This suggests that educational 
investments via, for instance, public 
education can play an important role 
in successful institutional develop-
ment. And as our case study illus-
trates, Latin America has historically 
lagged far behind the U.S. and Canada 
in educational achievement. 
  If anything, the new theories are 
strongly consistent with the hypothesis 
that persistent inequality generally 
hinders institutional development and 
thereby slows growth, even before 
taking into account strategic political 
considerations. Just as important, they 
suggest that inequality should have lim-
ited impact on growth when effective 
institutions are in place.
  The empirical literature has, in- 
deed, found that the impact of in-
equality on growth is stronger in 
nations where markets function poor- 
ly.16 We can illustrate this by taking 
a second look at the relationship be-
tween income inequality in 1960 and 
growth over the next four decades. 
This time, we divide the sample into 
three groups based on the effective- 
ness of their market institutions, re-
flected by each country’s score on the 
The new theories 
are strongly consistent 
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on growth, but it’s clear that growth, 
in turn, affects inequality. A large 
literature studies this direction of 
causality. The famous Kuznets hypoth-
esis—that growth initially increases 
inequality but eventually reduces 
it—has been challenged by the recent 
increase in earnings inequality in 
much of the industrialized world. 
Satisfactory theories of the relation-
ship between growth and inequality 
will have to account for these recent 
patterns.
  Even at this early stage, how-
ever, strong themes are emerging 
from studies of inequality. One seems 
particularly important: To the extent 
inequality is detrimental to growth, the 
impact rises with the severity of mar-
ket imperfections. This suggests that 
dealing with these deficiencies—for 
example, by better protecting prop-
erty rights and removing obstacles to 
financial development—is a key step 
toward economic development and 
poverty reduction.
Quintin is a senior economist and policy advisor 
and Saving a senior economist in the Research 
Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Notes
1 See “The Poverty-Growth-Inequality Triangle,” 
by François Bourguignon, unpublished paper, 
World Bank, March 2004.
2 This article draws heavily from various survey 
papers, particularly “Inequality and Economic 
Growth: The Perspective from New Growth 
Theories,” by Philippe Aghion, Eve Caroli and 
Cecilia García-Peñalos, Journal of Economic 
Literature, vol. 37, December 1999, pp. 1615–
60, and “Inequality and Growth,” by Roland 
Benabou, NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 1996. 
3 See, for example, “Political Equilibrium, Income 
Distribution, and Growth,” by Roberto Perotti, 
Review of Economic Studies, vol. 60, October 
1993, pp. 755–76; “Redistributive Policies and 
Economic Growth,” by Alberto Alesina and Dani 
Rodrick, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 
109, May 1994, pp. 465–90; and “Is Inequality 
Harmful for Growth?” by Thorsten Persson and 
Guido Tabellini, American Economic Review, vol. 
84, June 1994, pp. 600–21.
4 For instance, using panel evidence rather 
than cross-sectional evidence leads to very 
different conclusions. See “A Reassessment 
of the Relationship Between Inequality and 
Growth,” by Kristin Forbes, American Economic 
Review, vol. 90, September 2000, pp. 869–87. 
This is interpreted as evidence that the negative 
relationship between inequality and growth holds 
in the long run but may not hold over shorter 
horizons.
5 This section draws heavily from “History 
Lessons: Institutions, Factor Endowments, and 
Chart 5
Inequality	and	Growth	by	Nation
A. Countries in Bottom Third of Fraser Ranking for Regulation of Credit, Labor 
   and Business
Average real GDP growth, 1960–2000 (percent)
B. Countries in Top Third of Fraser Ranking for Regulation of Credit, Labor 
     and Business
Average real GDP growth, 1960–2000 (percent)
NOTES: The income Gini is an index that rises with income inequality. Some countries identified for illustration 
purposes.
SOURCES: The Fraser Institute; World Bank; Penn World Table Version 6.2, by Alan Heston, Robert Summers and 
Bettina Aten, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices, University of Pennsylvania, 
September 2006.

















10 20 30 40 50 60 70














ChileThe Economy in Action 
 
Come to the Dallas Fed web site for data, analysis and resources on the 
Texas, Mexico and border economies. We’ve made it easy for you to 
access state and metro business-cycle indexes, employment 
statistics, manufacturing data, energy updates and more.  
 
Simply go to www.dallasfed.org and 
click on Economic Research, 
The Economy in Action. 
Bookmark it!
Paths of Development in the New World,” by 
Kenneth Sokoloff and Stanley Engerman, Journal 
of Economic Perspectives, vol. 14, Summer 
2000, pp. 217–32.
6 See “The Effect of the Expansion of the Voting 
Franchise on the Size of Government,” by 
Thomas Husted and Lawrence Kenny, Journal of 
Political Economy, vol. 105, February 1997, pp. 
54–82.
7 For more on this subject, see “Why Isn’t the 
Whole World Developed?” by Richard Easterlin, 
Journal of Economic History, vol. 41, March 
1981, pp. 1–19.
8 This argument is formalized in Aghion, Caroli 
and García-Peñalos and Benabou (note 2).
9 See “A Theory of Trickle-Down Growth and 
Development,” by Philippe Aghion and Patrick 
Bolton, Review of Economic Studies, vol. 64, 
April 1997, pp. 151–72.
10 See, for instance, “Imperfect Capital Markets 
and the Persistence of Initial Wealth Inequalities,” 
by Thomas Piketty, London School of Economics 
Working Paper no. TE/92/255, 1992.
11 See Alesina and Rodrick and Persson and 
Tabellini (note 3).
12 For further information on income mobility in 
the United States, see Myths of Rich and Poor, 
by W. Michael Cox and Richard Alm, New York: 
Basic Books, 1999.
13 See “Preferences for Redistribution in the 
Land of Opportunities,” by Alberto Alesina and 
Eliana La Ferrera, Journal of Public Economics, 
vol. 89, June 2005, pp. 897–931, and “Social 
Mobility and the Demand for Redistribution,” by 
Roland Benabou and Efe Ok, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, vol. 116, May 2001, pp. 447–87.
14 See Benabou (note 2). 
15 For such a framework, see “Inequality and 
Growth: The Institutional Link,” by Thorsen 
Koeppl, Cyril Monnet and Erwan Quintin, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas, unpublished paper, 
2007.
16 See Benabou (note 2) for a detailed discussion.
17 Data are from Economic Freedom of the 
World: 2007 Annual Report, by James D. 
Gwartney and Robert A. Lawson, Fraser Institute, 
2007, www.fraserinstitute.org/Commerce.Web/
product_files/EFW2007BOOK2.pdf.
EconomicLetter  is  published  monthly 
by  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Dallas.  The  views 
expressed are those of the authors and should not be 
attributed to the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas or the 
Federal Reserve System.
  Articles may be reprinted on the condition that 
the source is credited and a copy is provided to the 
Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Dallas.
  Economic  Letter  is  available  free  of  charge 
by  writing  the  Public  Affairs  Department,  Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas, P.O. Box 655906, Dallas, TX 
75265-5906; by fax at 214-922-5268; or by telephone 
at 214-922-5254. This publication is available on the 
Dallas Fed web site, www.dallasfed.org.
Richard W. Fisher
President and Chief Executive Officer
Helen E. Holcomb
First Vice President and Chief Operating Officer
Harvey Rosenblum
Executive Vice President and Director of Research
W. Michael Cox
Senior Vice President and Chief Economist
Robert D. Hankins









FEDERAl RESERvE BAnk oF DAllAS
2200 n. PEARl ST.
DAllAS, TX 75201